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R

ecent years have witnessed the usual
type of competition-related activity
on both sides of the Atlantic.
In Europe, new regulations and
guidelines have been published on horizontal
and vertical relationships. In the United States,
a new standard on resale price maintenance
has been issued by the Supreme Court and
new horizontal merger guidelines were released
by the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission.

@

But all these specific developments have left
unanswered the fundamental policy question
that should be on the lips of competition
lawyers around the globe: Ultimately, what
are we after? What are our fundamental goals
when we apply antitrust and competition rules?

Abstract

Globalisation of business makes it

important for firms to predict how their
behaviour is likely to be treated in the
roughly 200 nations that have competition
laws. In that context, a crucial question is:
are we in a position to develop a common
intellectual framework that would give
coherence to policy statements made on
specific competition related issues and, at
the same time, be acceptable, broadly, in
a variety of legal systems, not necessarily
based on identical assumptions? We believe
that the answer is “yes”. A concept is
emerging as a possible source of unification
for competition policies around the globe:
the concept of “consumer choice”.

Avec l’internationalisation des échanges,

il devient essentiel pour les entreprises
de prédire comment leur comportement
est susceptible d’être appréhendé dans les
200 nations qui, à ce jour, ont adopté des
règles de la concurrence. Dans ce contexte,
un défi majeur est de construire un cadre
intellectuel commun qui permettrait de
justifier en profondeur les positions que
nous adoptons à l’égard de problèmes
particuliers en droit de la concurrence, tout
en demeurant acceptable, en substance,
dans un ensemble de systèmes juridiques,
qui ne sont pas nécessairement fondés sur
des valeurs identiques. Nous pensons que
le défi peut être relevé. Un concept est en
train d’émerger comme une source possible
d’unification pour les politiques de la
concurrence menées dans le monde entier :
le concept de “choix du consommateur”.

Some will say this question already has been
answered by our colleagues with a Chicago
School orientation: we should only be
concerned about economic efficiency, so what
we should do is to figure out the most efficient
legal rules.
Others contend, however, competition regimes
around the world want to take account of a
wider variety of values. The laws of some
jurisdictions care about a number of different
values, even including non-economic concerns.
Regardless, surely we all agree that to the extent
possible it would be better for international firms
to be able to better understand the competition
laws that roughly 200 nations have today, in the
hope that this understanding will help them
better to predict how they will be treated around
the globe. This is especially important because
even the very vocabulary used to characterize
these laws is diverse. Whether in English or in
French, people speak different languages when
it comes to antitrust and competition. Different
words can be used to mean the same thing, and
sometimes the same term can mean something
different in different nations.
And so the crucial question for the next
generation of competition law is: can we
develop a common intellectual framework that
will both give coherence to the specific policy

statements that are made, and also be broadly
acceptable in a variety of legal systems?
We believe that the answer is “yes”. We are
optimistic because a concept is emerging as
a possible unifying concept for competition
policy around the globe: the concept of
“consumer choice.” This is basically a way of
systematically taking account of short term
variety and non-price competition, and also
long term innovation, as well as the traditional
choices made on the basis of price and efficiency.
The Emerging Concept in Europe
In Europe the concept of choice has mainly
come to the foreground in Article 102 TFUE
cases, which concern abuses by firms in
dominant position. Traditionally, these cases
are the ones where policy questions are asked
and doctrine is developed.
In Article 102 cases the European Commission
has adopted a series of decisions, and the
European courts have issued a number of
rulings, which all go in the direction of
protecting consumer choices in general, rather
than only focusing on price competition.
In Microsoft, for instance, the Commission took
great pains to explain, very clearly and explicitly,
that consumer choice is the foundation of
competition policy – and indeed of proper
market functioning.1 The Commission’s main
point was that by withholding substantial
information and by tying its media software to
its platform, Microsoft created a situation where
customers were prevented from making real
choices based on their non-price preferences:
choices that would have allowed them to opt for
the products corresponding best to their needs
if the markets had been competitive.
The reasoning underlying this holding is that
the effects on variety, non-price competition,
and innovation can be most accurately assessed
if they are assessed directly. In theory one
could translate these factors into some measure
1

Commission Decision, of 24.03.2004, relating to a proceeding under
article [102] of the EC treaty (case COMP/c-3/37.792 Microsoft),
available in full on the web site of DG COMP.

Concurrences N° 2-2011 I Foreword I “Consumer choice” Is where We Are all Going - So Let’s Go Together

1

Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende
(art. L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.

Foreword

@ See also in the electronic supplement:
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This sort of reasoning was backed by the
European courts in Microsoft2 and in many
other cases. In Wanadoo3, for instance, the
incumbent telecom operator argued that it had
no incentive to sell at a loss because it would
not be in a position to increase prices after the
elimination of competition because barriers
to entry were low, and thus high prices would
immediately and inevitably attract potential
competitors onto the market. So, the firm
asserted, there was no likelihood it would
actually engage in predatory behaviour. That
argument appeared particularly powerful in
terms of traditional competition law, which
is price-centered and focused on maximizing
productive efficiency.
Not at all, said the Court in its judgment: the
goal of competition law is not only to ensure
that prices remain low; it is also to guarantee
that consumers are granted an opportunity to
choose among a sufficient array of possibilities.
On the facts of the case, the Court continued,
the behaviour adopted by France Telecom may
have caused prices to go down. But it also
endangered the survival of a sufficient number
of alternatives among which consumers would
be able to choose the services which best suited
their preferences.

to those products that would remain available,
this can constitute a harm to customers over
and above any effects on the price or quality of
any given product.”
Consumer choice has also been taken into
account by a large number of courts in the
United States, and often has resulted in the
condemnation of practices that had no direct
effects on price. In the 2011 Realcomp II
decision, for example, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals considered the conduct of a realestate listing service that tended to exclude
low-price, low-service discount brokerages from
the market.4 The court assumed that Realcomp
did not set commission rates or prices and, in
any event, firms offering more or less elaborate
brokerage services might all have the same
quality adjusted price.
But the court nonetheless found a violation of
the antitrust laws: “Realcomp does not regulate
rates of commission, offers of compensation,
or other price terms; thus, we examine the
effect of Realcomp’s restrictions on consumer
choice, specifically, the reduction in competitive
brokerage options available to home sellers.”
These developments do not mean that enforcers
or courts in Europe or the United States ignore
consideration of price and efficiency, of course.
In most cases those will be the most relevant
dimensions of competition, and the most
relevant subjects of consumer choice. In both
Europe and the United States, however, they no
longer appear to be the sole subjects.
Choice as a point for global convergence

Similar trend in the United States
The concept of consumer choice has been
similarly developing in the United States, as
new ideas grow up through the cracks in the old
Chicago School doctrines.
One example may be found in the new
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, issued in
August, 2010. That contains a new idea, in
section 6.4, to directly assess “innovation and
product quality.” The Guidelines note that
adverse effects in these respects can constitute
an antitrust violation in themselves: “If the
merged firm would withdraw a product that a
significant number of customers strongly prefer
2

General Court, judgement of 17 September 2004, T-201/04,
Microsoft v Commission, Report p. II- 3601. No appeal was lodged
against the judgment.

3

Wanadoo, Commission Decision (EEC) relating to a procedure
under Article 82 EC (Case COMP/38.233 – Wanadoo Interactive);
France Telecom SA v Commission of the European Communities Case
C-202/07 P [2009] ECR I-2369; France Telecom SA v Commission of
the European Communities Case T-340/03 [2007] ECR II-107.

In light of these developments we believe that
consumer choice is now a viable center point
for the global convergence of competition
law. It is broadly consistent with a variety of
national values, representing neither an extreme
efficiency focus nor an extreme emphasis
on social or political values. And it is also
consistent with the specifics of a wide variety
of particular statutes. It does not replace those
statutes, but acts as an implementing concept to
help explain, interpret and apply each of them
in its own context.
Programme ahead
There is no doubt that more work needs to be
done on and around the idea of “choice” in
competition and antitrust before the concept
can be used on a regular basis. For instance,
behavioural economics has pointed out that
4

Realcomp II, Ltd. V. FTC, 2011 WL 1261180 (April 6, 2011).

Concurrences N° 2-2011 I Foreword I “Consumer choice” Is where We Are all Going - So Let’s Go Together

2

Ce document est protégé au titre du droit d'auteur par les conventions internationales en vigueur et le Code de la propriété intellectuelle du 1er juillet 1992. Toute utilisation non autorisée constitue une contrefaçon, délit pénalement sanctionné jusqu'à 3 ans d'emprisonnement et 300 000 € d'amende
(art. L. 335-2 CPI). L’utilisation personnelle est strictement autorisée dans les limites de l’article L. 122 5 CPI et des mesures techniques de protection pouvant accompagner ce document. This document is protected by copyright laws and international copyright treaties. Non-authorised use of this document
constitutes a violation of the publisher's rights and may be punished by up to 3 years imprisonment and up to a € 300 000 fine (Art. L. 335-2 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle). Personal use of this document is authorised within the limits of Art. L 122-5 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle and DRM protection.

Foreword

of “quality adjusted price.” That translation
is, however, extraordinarily difficult to perform
when it comes to innovation or qualities of
fashion or personal preference, and it is not
often even attempted very often. Considering
“choice” explicitly will make it possible to
consider these non-price issues more effectively.

There is also a question of the possible limits
on “choice” as the best means of protecting
consumer interests. Often we compel firms to
provide information or stop providing deceptive
information and then let consumers choose
from among the products on the market. The
question, however, is when we should protect
consumers by using consumer protection law
and when we should do this by the use of
competition law! Or when we should use both?

And there is the issue of “public choice
theory”, which looks into the enforcers’own
decision-making process and the reasons why
official agents behave as they sometimes do.
The question is whether competition choice
theory might leave these agents with too much
discretion.
However, these issues should not prevent us
from investigating the possibility that “choice”
may prove an ideal meeting point between
traditions within, and between, the United
States and the European Union. In fact, that
possibility is so real that, now, already, around
the globe, several academics are proposing to
make it the focus of their analysis and meetings
in the months ahead.
n
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“choice” is not a value that should simply be
maximized. For example, at times consumers
may be paralyzed by having too many choices.
So the optimal level of choice must be that which
competition and the free market would have
offered, not the maximum possible number.
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